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Abstract 
Traffic analysis and anomaly detection have been extensively used to 
characterize network utilization as well as to identify abnormal 
network traffic such as malicious attacks. However, so far, techniques 
for traffic analysis and anomaly detection have been carried out 
independently, relying on mechanisms and algorithms either in edge 
or in core networks alone. In this paper we propose the notion of 
multi-level network resilience, in order to provide a more robust 
traffic analysis and anomaly detection architecture, combining 
mechanisms and algorithms operating in a coordinated fashion both 
in the edge and in the core networks. This work is motivated by the 
potential complementarities between the research being developed at 
IIT Madras and Lancaster University. In this paper we describe the 
current work being developed at IIT Madras and Lancaster on traffic 
analysis and anomaly detection, and outline the principles of a multi-
level resilience architecture. 
Keywords: 
Traffic Analysis, Core and Edge Networks, Network Resilience, 
Anomaly Detection 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traffic analysis and anomaly detection are extensively used 
to understand and characterize network traffic behaviour, as well 
as to identify abnormal operational conditions such as malicious 
attacks. However, techniques for traffic analysis and anomaly 
detection are typically carried out independently in different 
parts of the network, either in the edge or in the core networks 
alone. In fact, different traffic characteristics and anomalies can 
normally be better observed in a specific part of the network, 
although they affect the network as a whole. In this paper, we 
advocate that a comprehensive architecture for network 
resilience must combine traffic analysis and anomaly detection 
mechanisms and algorithms deployed both in the core and edge 
networks, thus introducing the notion of multi-level network 
resilience. 
This work is motivated by the potential complementarities 
between the research being developed at IIT Madras and 
Lancaster University. On the one hand, researchers at IIT 
Madras have concentrated on traffic analysis and anomaly 
detection at the edge of the network, monitoring and measuring 
Internet traffic at web server proxies. In addition to prediction of 
network attacks based on SYN flooding, overall traffic and 
individual user’s traffic behaviour is also monitored, in order to 
classify, predict and control user bandwidth using ARIMA 
timeseries models of network usage. On the other hand, 
Lancaster University has focused on the classification of attack-
related traffic in core networks, in terms of volume-based 
detection of anomalies. The applicability of energy Time-
Frequency distributions alongside the use of Renyi information 
has been utilized for distinguishing malicious traffic from the 
rest of application-layer protocols as seen on the transport layer 
of a core network. 
Both Lancaster and IIT Madras are looking at similar 
machine-learning algorithms for anomaly detection, traffic 
shaping and prediction. IIT Madras’ approach is interesting 
since there are computational resources available at the edge of 
the network to perform efficiently algorithms for anomaly 
detection. However, considering anomaly detection only at the 
end node is limiting since it only observes the effects on 
particular end-systems at the edge of the network but does not 
consider the effects on the network itself. Particularly with 
multiple, coordinated attacks the network might be the actual 
target of the attacker rather than any specific services. Therefore, 
detection should be done as early as possible, alongside the 
network, to increase the evidence and to detect anomalies in a 
more coordinated manner. This is in line with recent trends in 
network-wide and backbone anomaly detection research.  
Hence the proposed joint work on multi-level resilience is 
timely and current. There is a good potential for collaboration in 
investigating the effects, results and benefits of both approaches 
combined. This papers presents an initial investigation on an 
integrated anomaly detection infrastructure, combining metrics 
and mechanisms from both edge and core networks. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes our 
independent work in traffic analysis and anomaly detection, both 
in the core and in the edge networks, presenting the mechanisms 
and the algorithms that we intend to integrate in order to realise 
the notion of multi-level network resilience. Section 3 outlines 
the simulation platform that will permit the evaluation of multi-
level network resilience strategies. Section 4 briefly describes a 
case study scenario that is used to illustrate the ideas presented 
in this paper. Finally, Section 5 presents our concluding remarks. 
2. CORE NETWORKS AND EDGE 
NETWORKS OBSERVATIONS  
2.1 TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IN CORE NETWORKS 
Network backbone link traffic exhibits dynamic 
characteristics which are classified as highly non-stationary due 
to their non-constant instantaneous frequency and group delay 
on the Time-Frequency (TF) plane [7]. Under the intention of 
characterizing these dynamics we found as most appropriate to 
exploit the capabilities provided by energy distributions and we 
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have particularly employed formulations belonging in the Cohen 
class of distributions [8]. In particular, we assessed the task of 
application-layer classification with the utilization of 
meaningful, discriminative metrics extracted from the Choi-
Williams distribution [9].  These metrics were used as the 
numerical features for our tree-based classification as being 
provided within the treefit() and classregtree() MATLAB utility 
functions.  
 Our analysis was based upon the independent evaluation and 
observation of the transport protocol’s (i.e. TCP, UDP) volume-
wise behaviour (i.e. counts of packets and bytes per 
unidirectional flow) with respect to their utilization from the 
application protocols/clients. The operational network trace used 
was an hour long sample captured at the Samplepoint-B 
backbone link of the WIDE network and provided by the Mawi 
working group [10]. 
2.1.1. Cohen-Based Energy Distribution and the Choi-
Williams Formulation: 
One of the main problems occurring in TF energy 
representations is that many functions developed under the 
”energy” concept generating such distributions include complex 
and negative values. Even though authors in [8] support the 
incentive of employing a TF energy distribution function by 
having a signal under its analytical form they argue that the 
resulting distributions cannot be considered as proper 
probabilities for real valued signals. Due to the aforementioned 
drawback, Cohen in [11] complementing the work by Wigner 
formulated an initial generic method to generate a range of 
functions which can satisfy the marginal properties which 
enabled the acquisition of positive distributions. 
If we let our signal be s(t) and its analytical form be s(u), the 
representation of the Cohen class of distributions is formulated 
as: 
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where (,), is a two-dimensional kernel function determining 
the specific distribution on a given signal and should satisfy: 
1)0,()0,(                              (2) 
 Under their intention of attenuating cross and self terms 
initiated by a signal on the TF plane Choi and Williams in 
devised a Cohen-based distribution which intuitively (and in 
many cases in practice) satisfies up to a high level of accuracy 
the description of a signal’s energy concentration on the TF 
plane. The initial approach by Choi and Williams was to 
consider a signal s(t) constructed by a number of components:  
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By substituting the above definition in the general Cohen 
class of distributions equation (i.e. formula 1) we obtain a 
resulting distribution which is composed by the sum of self and 
cross terms as naturally evolved by frequency scaling on the 
signal itself alongside the cross-scaling triggered by the 
individual signal components. 
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The sum of cross terms Mai(t,) always under the general 
Cohen equation (formula 1) is represented as: 
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(5)  
In parallel with their intention of exploring distributions 
under the notions of self and cross terms, Choi and Williams 
realized that interference terms would be greatly reduced with a 
choice of a particular kernel function for (,). This kernel 
function would minimize the cross terms and at the same time 
retain the desirable properties of the self terms.  By investigating 
the local autocorrelation function as well as using the ambiguity 
concept their finalized kernel method was derived as: 
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where  is a constant and is the core variable for controlling the 
suppression of the signal’s cross terms and frequency resolution. 
Using formulas 1, 4, 5, 6 and after per- integration the resulting 
Choi-Williams distribution is:   
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The Choi-Williams (CW) distribution was the mean for 
mapping the measurements obtained for the packet/byte time 
series as seen from each transport protocol. In parallel they 
constituted towards the generation of the Renyi information 
which it was used as the basic discriminative feature for 
classifying our application-signals. 
2.1.2. Renyi Information: 
According to generic information-theoretical principles, the 
extraction and measurement of information on the TF plane can 
be easily achieved with the utilization of the (always positive) 
spectrogram and the well known Shannon entropy. Nevertheless, 
in virtue of the resolution trade-off [12] and bias of the 
spectrogram it is quite disadvantageous to employ it on any of 
the Cohen-based TF distributions. In parallel, due to the negative 
values present in some of these distributions it is also quite 
inefficient to apply the Shannon’s entropy for gaining valuable 
information with respect with the complexity of a given signal 
on the TF plane.    
However, information-theoretic and signal processing 
literature [14], suggest the 3
rd
 order Renyi entropy (in some 
cases also called as dimension) as one of the most accurate 
methods for interpreting a signal’s complexity. The notion of 
complexity is mapped as the number of elementary components 
composing the main signal and is measured in bits. In our 
elementary independent components in our signal are 
corresponding to large deviations from the average packet/byte 
count. Therefore, a large positive-valued Renyi information 
value in bits shows that our signal has high complexity and it is 
composed by a number of components which significantly differ 
numerically from the average byte/pkts count on the TF plane. 
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Fig.1. Tree-based application classification under the CW distribution for WIDE on TCP-packets 
The generalized Renyi information in contrast with the 
Shannon entropy information is a formulation that accepts 
negative values within the under analysis energy TF distribution 
and is defined as: 
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As shown in formula 8, the generalized Renyi information is 
dependent upon the tuning variable a that determines the order 
of the Renyi entropy. In the case of 1
st
 order Renyi entropy, we 
recover the Shannon entropy and the Kullback-Leibler 
divergence and as mentioned earlier it is inefficient to use it 
particularly on any Cohen-based TF distribution. Furthermore, 
the case of a = 2 is ruled out since according to [1]a.[11] the 
term  




1),(2  dtdtM   resulting to 02 MR  for any 
type of signal. Thus, for the specific case of Cohen-based TF 
distributions it suggested for a  3 and by employing it on 
formula 8 we obtain: 
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Formula 9 enabled our experimentation to determine distinct 
complexity measurements for particular Internet applications 
and alongside the TF moments we were able to construct a 
feature set for each of the observational datasets and use them 
within our tree-based categorization.  The evaluation presented 
within this document describes mainly the packet-based 
application-classification.  
2.1.3. Classifying Applications on WIDE Based Upon the TCP 
Packet-Based Utilization: 
The hour long trace from WIDE was broken in to 4 equal 
bins (i.e. WIDE-I, II, III and IV) of 13.75 minutes each.   
Using the behavioral and port-based extraction scheme 
provided by the work done in BLINC [1]a.[12] we initially 
extracted the counts of packets associated with TCP and then 
associated each application with its packet-based utilization. A 
subsequent process was to compute the CW distribution for each 
distinct application and further estimate the Renyi information 
provided by each. Specifically we used the sample of WIDE-I as 
a training set and the remaining samples as the testing sets in our 
classification.   
As Fig.1 illustrates our simple tree-based classification 
provided ranks for every application present within the WIDE 
trace and assigned complexity ranks to each.  
Apparently, from a bytes and packets perspective, the most 
complex signal which is structured by intensive flows is the 
traffic triggered by unknown applications (i.e. R<527.135). Even 
though this particular traffic category didn’t exhibit the largest 
amount of unidirectional flows it contained unknown 
applications that were frequently observed throughout the whole 
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WIDE trace and most of them consumed a considerable portion 
of TCP from a packets perspective. Following the lead of 
unknown traffic and second in rank was as anticipated the HTTP 
protocol. As being the dependency for the most commonly used 
applications (e.g. WWW), HTTP had volume-wise the biggest 
amount of flows but its transmissions on average were not 
largely intensive from a packets and bytes perspective. We argue 
that one of the main reasons of being ranked as highly complex 
in this case is due to its enormously big sample size in 
comparison with the rest of the extracted application protocols. 
Apart from that, there were obviously transmissions associated 
with certain applications (e.g. Apache HTTP servers) that 
demonstrated extremely high TCP utilization from a packets 
perspective. However, we can generally conclude that HTTP-
based applications throughout the WIDE trace exhibited 
individually a higher number of packets per flow rather than 
being flows with fewer packets determined by big byte sizes.   
SMB resides as well in the high valued Renyi branches (i.e. 
R<107.763) indicating its frequent appearance in the WIDE 
trace overall. Its placement in this level of complexity indicates 
that SMB-related applications are volume-wise consuming in 
both TCP packets and bytes. In addition, as similarly observed in 
the Keio networks, this high SMB utilization is supportive 
evidence in the argument that the majority of users in the WIDE 
network were running MS-Windows.  Leaving aside SMB, we 
also noticed high packet-wise utilization from SMTP-based mail 
as well as with SSH. Based upon the byte-based rankings, SMTP 
was expected to be categorized as highly complex and intensive 
but on the other it was intriguing the classification achieved for 
SSH. Via this packet-based categorization we could get an 
insight related with SSH-related transmissions and summarize 
that SSH unidirectional flows are much more intensive from a 
packets perspective. Subsequent intensive application protocols 
in the branches where R<70.5613 were expected protocols 
involved with network operations (i.e. NetBIOS), DNS, attack-
related traffic particularly on ports 135 and 1025, as well as 
secured HTTP connections (i.e. HTTPS). 
Possessing a noteworthy amount of TCP packet-wise traffic 
was a TCP utility protocol that of Ident (R<15.1322) which was 
followed by intensive chat applications such as Yahoo! 
Messenger and MSN. Furthermore, file transfers through FTP 
alongside P2P distribution platforms like Bittorrent, PeerEnabler 
and DirectConnect were noticed to use a significant amount of 
TCP packets in each of their flows.  Going to lower branches we 
see rankings of medium complexities (i.e. R<11.4406) to be 
assigned in a variety of applications dealing with P2P (eDonkey, 
FastTrack), live streaming with QuickTime and POP-based mail. 
Relatively having slightly less volume and complexity-wise 
significance were applications in the even lower branch (i.e. 
R<9.0609) indicating their occasional utilization such as IMAP-
based mail, chat through AOL’s Messenger (i.e. AIM), 
encrypted IMAP `mail, P2P traffic via Gnutella and Limewire as 
well as internet live streaming through Shoutcast and MMS.  Of 
lesser importance with respect to their Renyi estimates (i.e. 
R<7.40135) were traditionally UDP-based applications such as 
P2P distribution platforms such as OpenNapster, GoBoogy and 
SoulSeek and Yahoo! Messenger’s video utilities. Similarly with 
the byte-based analysis, Trojans initiated in various TCP 
destination ports indicated an insignificant traffic impact with 
low packet complexity. In fact, the majority of identified Trojans 
and malicious flows carrying worms were associated with well 
known vulnerable TCP ports (e.g. 16, 27, 30, 68). Specifically 
the Trojans identified were those of Skunk, Backboor.Trojan and 
Assassin [1]a.[14].   
2.2 TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IN EDGE NETWORKS 
2.2.1.  Detection of DoS Attacks: 
Time series models are used for modeling and prediction of 
network traffic. Most techniques assume stationarity and 
predictability of the given series. In this paper, an attempt is 
made to analyse network traffic at an edge router in the context 
of TCP SYN based DoS (Denial of Service) attack, using linear 
time series models. The network feature studied in this paper is 
called the Half-Open Count discussed in Section 5.1.  Earlier 
work [24] on this feature modeled it using Auto-Regressive 
(AR) technique, for detection of TCP SYN based DoS (Denial 
of Service) attack at the victim server. But, some of the 
drawbacks of this approach are: stationarity and predictability of 
the time series data are not ensured, but rather assumed, as in the 
case of other related work [4] – [6]. Further, model coefficients 
are recomputed for every observation window of size 6 samples 
(with sampling interval of 10s), which slides over the time series 
one sample at a time. The recomputed coefficients are then used 
for prediction of the attack. This perhaps takes care of the non-
stationarity in the data, but re-computation of coefficients for 
every window of such small size may not be a good approach in 
terms of practical implementation.  
Internet being an extremely dynamic and constantly evolving 
system, it is   unlikely to find any feature that will be invariant 
across all networks at all times. Hence the solution to traffic 
modeling lies in performing suitable transformations on the half-
open time series. In particular, two transformations are discussed 
in this paper, namely differencing and averaging. The effect of 
these on the original series are studied and compared. Further, 
from the analysis, predictability of the time series is found to 
have strong correlation with Hurst exponent, Auto-correlation 
and Smoothness of the series. 
Data Set Used 
Network trace was collected over a period of three months 
from July 15th 2010 to September 30th 2010, from the TENET 
gateway of IIT Madras, using TCPDUMP tool [25]. The 
gateway connects TENET network to the Internet. The 
bandwidth of the link connecting the gateway to the service 
provider is currently 4Mbps. From this trace, the difference in 
number of incoming (traffic entering from outside network) 
SYN packets and number of outgoing (traffic leaving to outside 
network) SYN-ACK packets, called half-open count, are 
extracted at equally spaced time intervals of 10s. For the 
analysis, three data sets are created, each consisting of 5 days 
(i.e 24 hrs x 5 days) data, from Monday to Friday. These data 
sets are checked for any existing TCP SYN DoS attack, by 
verifying whether all the connection requests are valid. This is 
done to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in the 
context of TCP SYN based DoS attack detection, discussed in 
Section 5.7. Since the detection algorithm works on the number 
of half-open connections, it will scale for different network 
sizes. 
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Transformations of Time Series 
Three different time series of half-open feature are compared 
in this paper: (a) original, (b) difference and (c) average. To 
generate the difference series, absolute value of the difference 
for consecutive samples is computed. This is also called first 
differencing [26], [27]. A moving average function of the 
original time series using a sliding window of size 30 samples, 
with a one-sample shift, is computed, to form the average time 
series. 
Fig.1 (a) – (c) show the original, difference and average time 
series for the data set-1 for Monday and Thursday respectively. 
Similar trend is observed for other days. Couple of observations 
are worth mentioning: First, the short time variations (spikes) 
can be seen in the original and difference series, but are absent in 
the average series. Such frequent spikes hints that any threshold 
based techniques, like the ones discussed in [28], [29], to detect 
DoS attacks, may not work for these two cases. This is because 
it is highly unlikely that a model can be built which can predict 
frequent spikes accurately. Second, long term variations or trend 
present in the original series are removed in the difference series 
but retained in the average series. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig.2. (a) Original (b) Difference (c) Average time series for 
data set 1 
Stationarity Test 
A process is said to be wide-sense stationary if the mean and 
autocorrelation of the process are invariant over time. This is 
also called weak stationarity [26], [27]. The intuitive idea of 
checking stationarity is to ensure whether the model parameters 
estimated are time invariant. Table.1, Table.2 and Table.3 show 
the mean for the original, difference and average series 
respectively. It can be observed that the means vary across three 
data sets, for all the three time series. But the means within each 
data set, for all the three series, does not show much variation.   
Table.1. Mean of Original Series 
Day I II III 
Mon 13.41 7.89 8.16 
Tue 11.43 8.15 6.7 
Wed 14.09 8.41 4.99 
Thur 14.37 8.44 4.71 
Fri 13.39 8.26 6.01 
Avg. 13.34 8.23 6.11 
Table.2. Mean of Difference Series 
Day I II III 
Mon 5.54 5.04 4.84 
Tue 5.01 5.09 4.21 
Wed 5.64 5.18 3.78 
Thur 5.74 5.04 3.67 
Fri 5.37 5.27 3.99 
Avg. 5.46 5.12 4.1 
Table.3. Mean of Average Series 
Day I II III 
Mon 13.43 7.89 8.16 
Tue 11.43 8.15 6.71 
Wed 14.1 8.41 4.99 
Thur 14.37 8.44 4.71 
Fri 13.39 8.26 6.01 
Avg. 13.34 8.23 6.11 
Fig.3.(a)-(c) show ACF graphs for data set-2, plotted for 
original, difference and average series respectively, which 
doesn't show much variation across different days for each 
series. Similar observations are seen for the other two data sets 
also. This indicates that, though all three series are non-
stationary across data sets, it appears that all are quasi-stationary 
with window size of 5 days or perhaps a week. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig.3. ACF for (a) Original (b) Difference (c) Average series for 
data set 2 
Smoothness Factor 
Matthew Roughan et al in their work on modeling backbone 
traffic [30] have quantified the smoothness of the time series in 
terms of relative variance (variance divided by the mean).  If the 
relative variance is low, series is said to be smooth or less 
bursty. Table.4 shows the smoothness computed for all the three 
transformations. Average series is found to be smooth compared 
to the other two series. 
Table.4. Smoothness 
Data Set 
Original 
Series 
Difference 
Series 
Average 
Series 
I 8.41 12.26 3.55 
II 14.72 19.38 2.15 
III 10.61 17.14 2.42 
Hurst Exponent Estimation 
Hurst exponent (H) [31], [32] is a measure of the burstiness 
of the time series. Time series can be classified based on the H 
value as (1) H = 0.5, for white Gaussian noise, (2) 0 < H < 0.5, is 
a mean reverting and less bursty series and (3) 0.5 < H < 1, is a 
bursty and trend reinforcing series.  None of the Hurst estimators 
give correct value and often give conflicting results as indicated 
in [31], [32], [33]. For the analysis described in this paper, a 
software package called SELFIS [34] is used for estimating 
Hurst exponent. Out of the several estimators that were tried out, 
apart from the rescaled range estimator (r/s method), other 
estimators show conflicting results and sometimes Hurst values 
outside the range, 0 to 1. Hence, Hurst estimation based on r/s 
method is used along with smoothening factor discussed in 
Section 5.4, to arrive at a meaningful conclusion. Details of r/s 
estimation are discussed in [33]. Table.5 shows the Hurst 
exponent values for the original, difference and average series. It 
can be observed that the Hurst values for the original and 
difference series are higher than the average series.  This shows 
that the average series is less bursty and smoother than the other 
two series. Also, there is no significant difference between Hurst 
exponent of original and difference series. 
Table.5. Hurst Values 
Data Set 
Original 
Series 
Difference 
Series 
Average 
Series 
I 0.71 0.62 0.44 
II 0.59 0.56 0.42 
III 0.62 0.57 0.42 
Modeling and Prediction 
In order to study the predictability of the series, each data set 
is considered stationary since the mean and auto- correlation are 
relatively constant within each data set as discussed in Section 
5.3. Auto-Regressive model discussed in [26], [27], is used to 
build the model using traffic on 1st day and predict the 5th day’s 
traffic. It is observed experimentally that model order of 2 is a 
good value for prediction. Note that, for each transformation, 
three models need to be built, one for each data set. Estimation 
of AR model coefficients are done by Yule-Walker method 
discussed in [26], [27].  Average relative prediction error is 
shown in Table.6. Relative error is computed by normalising 
prediction error with the actual value for every sample value 
predicted. 
Fig.4 shows the actual and predicted time series for all the 
three transformations of data set-1. It shows larger prediction 
error for the original and difference series compared to the 
average series. Similar behaviour is observed for other two data 
ISSN: 2229-6948(ONLINE)                                  ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY: SPECIAL ISSUE ON NEXT GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORKS AND 
APPLICATIONS, JUNE 2011, VOLUME – 2, ISSUE – 2  
351 
sets as well. It can be concluded from Table.6 and Fig.4 that the 
average series, which has retained the trend and removed the 
short-term variations or spikes from the original series, is more 
predictable than the other two.  Also, it may be noted that the 
relative error for the difference series is more than the original 
series, which means that differencing has made the original 
series less predictable. 
Table.6. Average Relative Error 
Data Set 
Original 
Series 
Difference 
Series 
Average 
Series 
I 0.46 0.90 0.01 
II 0.78 0.85 0.02 
III 0.77 0.87 0.03 
 
 
Fig.4. Actual vs Predicted for Original, Difference and Average 
Series for data set 1 
Detection of Attack 
A trace driven low rate TCP SYN based DoS attack is 
simulated by generating SYN packets with spoofed unreachable 
IP addresses to a victim server. Rate of the attack is varied 
uniformly from 10 to 20 SYN/second. Duration of the attack is 5 
minutes. Traffic trace at the victim server is collected and is 
mixed with normal traffic of 5th day of each data set to generate 
the attack traffic. The experiment is repeated for 10 times. 
Model is built on the average time series and tested to predict the 
attack traffic.  The relatively large prediction error during an 
attack can be utilised for detecting the attack by fixing a 
threshold on the prediction error. Fig.5 shows the probability of 
wrongly detecting an attack called False Positive (FP) and the 
probability of not detecting an attack called False Negative (FN) 
for various threshold values.  It is found that for a threshold 
value as 0.4, there is 0% FN and 3% FP. The worst-case 
detection delay is 5 minutes taking into account the window size 
of 30 samples for building the average series and sampling 
interval of 10s. 
 
Fig.5. False Positive Vs False Negative 
Discussion 
Most time series analysis of network data assumes 
stationarity and predictability of the given series. But the 
analysis has shown that such assumptions may not be valid at all 
times. Also, various transformations on the time series are 
studied and compared. It is found that appropriate 
transformations on the series can lead to linear models and good 
prediction. Predictability of a series is found to have increased 
with slowly decaying ACF, low Hurst exponent value and low 
relative variance. Detection of low rate TCP SYN DoS attack is 
demonstrated with 3% false positive for detecting all the attacks. 
Since the solution is applied at the edge router of the victim 
server and is based on the number of half-open connections, it is 
scalable to Distributed DoS attack as well. 
2.2.2. Prediction and Control of Bandwidth: 
A frequent and commonly occurring phenomenon in any 
network is the excessive use of bandwidth by a select group of 
users. Analysis of IITM proxy server logs shows that (Fig.6) 
upper band users who constitute less than 10% of users consume 
about 40% of the traffic, roughly following the Pareto 
distribution. It is commonly observed that even though the LAN 
has a dedicated high-speed link to the ISP, during peak hours, 
poor response times are observed by Internet users. Abnormal 
use may be treated as a special case of an anomaly. We therefore 
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propose the framework shown in Fig.7 for detection and control 
of excessive bandwidth usage.  We first monitor user activity, 
and based on this we generate models for predicting bandwidth 
usage for each user. The training of the models may be done 
once a month, while prediction may be performed on a daily 
basis. Then, we predict bandwidth usage, which may be used to 
categorize each user as belonging to one of three categories – 
high, middle or low bandwidth users. A suitable control 
algorithm may be implemented in order to control abnormal 
usage. 
 
 
Fig.6. Distribution of users (top) and traffic generated by each 
category (bottom) 
 
Fig.7. Framework for Bandwidth Prediction and Control 
Time series models have to offer many benefits for 
predicting values at discrete intervals of time. Firstly, they 
handle well sudden (erroneous) spikes in the data and prevent 
them from affecting the forecast. Secondly, they automatically 
adjust to the current trend in the values – which may be caused 
by changes in the environment – for example – the unavailability 
of a link to the ISP, which may in turn affect bandwidth usage. 
Thus, we have chosen time series models for modeling 
bandwidth usage.  
Predicting Bandwidth Usage 
A plot of the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions (Fig.8(a) and (b)) for the original series as well as the 
first and second difference show that the plots tail off quickly, 
suggesting that the data is stationary, and so time series models 
may be used. 
All our experiments were carried out using Squid Proxy 
Server logs for the month of January and February 2009. 
January data was used for training – i.e. computing model 
coefficients, and February data was used during the testing phase 
to compute the error between the forecast and actual values. The 
features we have considered are number of HTTP requests and 
number of bytes received for a particular user. Each sample data 
point in our case consists of the value of a feature (e.g. number 
of HTTP requests) accumulated over a period of two hours.  We 
performed the following experiments: 
1. Static Coefficients: Coefficients computed during the 
training phase were kept constant right through the testing 
phase. 
2. Dynamic Coefficients:  Coefficients were re-computed each 
time for forecasting the next value in the testing phase. 
3. Common Model for each Category:  Common model 
coefficients were computed for each category (e.g. high 
band users) and forecasting performed using this common 
model for all users. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig.8(a) Auto-correlation function and (b) Partial Auto-
correlation function 
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These experiments were carried out using AR, ARI, 
ARMA and ARIMA time series models for the same data set. 
The average relative error was computed as the error in 
prediction normalized by the actual data value. This was used to 
compare the predictive capability of the different models. 
The results indicate that there is no substantial difference 
between the performance of the static coefficients model and 
dynamic coefficients model. However, the static coefficients 
model performed better than the common model. The results for 
static coefficients across different models have been shown in 
Table.7. Best forecasting is obtained for ARI and ARIMA 
models. 
Table.7. Comparison of Different Time Series Models 
Model 
Average relative 
error for no of 
bytes 
Average relative 
error for no of 
requests 
AR 2.06 0.86 
ARI 0.52 0.51 
ARMA 1.6 0.88 
ARIMA 0.49 0.49 
Entropy-Based Scheme for Classification 
Entropy also seems to be a promising alternative means of 
analysing user access patterns. We may define for example the 
normalized entropy as 
    
  U
uPuP
=H Uu
log
log 
  
where U is the set of URLs accessed by a user. If the user 
typically has few frequently accessed sites, his normalized 
entropy value would be low, whereas if he typically accesses a 
large number of URLs as in the case of a high band user, his 
normalized entropy value would be high. Fig.9 shows the 
distribution of users for different values of normalized entropy. 
 
Fig.9. Distribution of Users for Different Normalized Entropy 
Ranges 
We would like to propose as a future direction the use of 
information-theoretic criteria to design a full-fledged classification 
scheme. 
3. SIMULATION PLATFORM 
It is difficult to evaluate complex multi-level resilience 
strategies that involve the interplay between a number of 
detection and remediation mechanisms both at the core and edge 
networks, which must be activated on demand according to 
events observed in the network (as opposed to hardcoded 
protocols). In order to evaluate such resilience strategies we 
have previously proposed the notion of a policy-driven resilience 
simulator [1], based on the integration of a network simulator 
and a policy management framework. The toolset allows the use 
of policies to specify the required management actions to be 
performed, according to conditions observed during run-time in 
the simulation. The use of policies for the specification of 
resilience strategies was previously described in [2]. For 
example, the policy shown Fig.10 can be used to reconfigure a 
rate-limiting component based on the occurrence of a high risk 
event (raised, for example, by an anomaly detection component) 
and additional contextual information, e.g. the current utilisation 
on a specific link. 
on AnomalyDetectorMO . highRisk ( link , src , dst )  
if (LinkMonitorMO. getUtilisation () >= 75%) 
                do RateLimiterMO . limit ( link , 60%) 
Fig.10. Management policy for reconfiguring a rate limiter 
component based on a high-risk event 
One of the direct benefits of integrating a network simulator 
with a policy framework is that we can understand how real 
policies dynamically affect the operation of resilience 
mechanisms running within the simulation environment, and 
then evaluate resilience strategies before they are deployed in the 
network infrastructure. This permits the evaluation of complex 
resilience strategies without the need of a real testbed 
deployment of mechanisms, which typically involves high costs 
of hardware and effort. The next sections briefly outline the 
design of the simulation platform and give details about our 
prototype implementation. 
3.1 DESIGN ISSUES 
The resilience simulation platform is primarily based on the 
integration between a network simulator and a policy 
management framework. In [16], a number of techniques for 
integrating a network simulator environment and external third 
party applications were compared: (a) socket connection relies 
on proxies within the simulation that maintain connections to 
third party applications, without incurring major changes to the 
third party application. This technique, however, may suffer 
from CPU scheduling problems because simulations typically 
run faster than the integrated third-party application; (b) source 
code integration can be straightforward for simple applications, 
but it is difficult to be implemented for larger applications 
because of build dependencies that must be resolved. 
Furthermore, threads in the third party application can still suffer 
from CPU scheduling issues and cause problems such as access 
violations; finally, (c) shared libraries is similar to source code 
integration, but is based on the integration between the simulator 
and the binary code of the third party application. This avoids 
the problems related to the building process, however, it still 
suffers from the threading and timing problems. 
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The integration technique used in our prototype 
implementation is based on proxies, similar to the socket 
connection method, but using RMI/RPC objects instead. 
Typically, this technique can be used if data from lower layer 
protocols is not exchanged with the external application [16]. 
For the resilience simulation platform, it is expected that CPU 
scheduling and synchronisation issues can be minimised because 
packet-level information is not exchanged with the policy 
framework. Instead, exchanges are limited to selected control 
events and the corresponding management commands alone. 
We have considered the use of the most popular network 
simulators, including NS-2 [18], NS-3 [19], OMNeT++ [20], 
SSFNet [21] and OPNET [22]. The choice of a network 
simulator was driven by a number of requirements, including (i) 
the ability to extend and instrument the simulation tool, (ii) the 
availability of a large number of network models, (iii) the 
scalability and performance of the simulator, and (iv) the ability 
of the simulator to model different types of networks. After an 
initial evaluation we discarded OPNET as it is a commercial tool 
and the source code for its simulation kernel is not publicly 
available, and NS-2 due to recurring reports of its poor 
scalability. We considered NS-3, OMNeT++ and SSFNet 
equally suitable for our requirements, but due to our previous 
experience with SSFNet and familiarity with its API the initial 
implementation described in [1] is based on this simulator. 
Recently, we have ported this prototype to an OMNeT++ 
implementation, since OMNeT++ is considered one of the most 
popular simulators for research in communication networks. 
3.2 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
The prototype is based on the integration between the 
network simulator and the Ponder2 policy framework [23]. 
Ponder2 implements a policy execution framework that supports 
the enforcement of event-condition-action (ECA) and 
authorisation policies. Policies are written in terms of managed 
objects programmed in Java, which are stored in a local domain 
service. Based on our previous investigations [17], Ponder2 was 
considered to be more extensible and with better infrastructure 
support when compared to other policy frameworks. 
Resilience mechanisms are represented by instrumented 
components in the simulation environment. They provide 
callback functions for management operations, and run 
alongside standard simulated objects. These instrumented 
components are implemented as OMNeT++ modules, and at the 
moment most are extensions of the standard Router module (we 
plan to instrument additional modules at the upper layers of the 
protocol stack as part of our future work). 
FlowExporterMO and IntrusionDetectionMO are positioned 
above the network layer, and receive duplicate packets. 
RateLimiterMO is placed in-line between the network and 
physical layers. Finally, LinkMonitorMO was implemented by 
modifying an existing channel type, allowing us to place it at 
any position within the network topology. 
 
 
Fig.11. Integration between a network simulator and Ponder2 
Such components export their callback functions through 
management interfaces, which are made accessible by the policy 
decision point (PDP). Communication between simulated 
objects and the external policy framework is implemented via 
adapter objects, which abstract invocation details using the 
XMLRPC protocol. An event broker resolves and maps event 
notifications from inside the simulation (e.g., anomaly 
detections, link utilization, etc) to the policy framework, which 
according to a dynamic set of policies invokes adaptive actions 
in the instrumented components running within the simulation 
(Fig.11). 
This platform permits the implementation of detection and 
remediation components both in core or edge networks. It can be 
used to explicitly model the interactions between these 
mechanisms and observe how they can dynamically impact the 
operation of the network. As part of our future work we intend 
to build a library of instrumented resilience components 
implementing detection and remediation mechanisms at both the 
core and the edge portions of the simulated network. 
4. MULTI-LEVEL RESILIENCE STRATEGIES 
4.1 MULTI-LEVEL WORM DETECTION 
Ultimately, multi-level resilience architecture would involve 
explicit interactions between edge and core mechanisms. We 
anticipate, for example, the exchanges of “hints” between edge 
and core detection mechanisms to assist in the more effectively 
gathering of evidence for particular types of anomalies. These 
hints may, for example, cause the modification of the set of 
management policies enforced by the components operating in a 
specific segment of the network. Likewise, we envisage also the 
collaboration between remediation mechanisms at different 
levels to mitigate an anomaly.  
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of a multi-level 
resilience strategy we propose a case study based on a worm 
propagation scenario. In this scenario, a collaborative core/edge 
methodology would employ cross-layering early detection and 
remediation of worm propagation before its full effect is 
achieved. Computer worms can quickly propagate in the Internet 
due to their self-replication capability, and severely disrupt the 
operation of the network in particular due to the increased 
network traffic. Therefore it is needed to detect worm 
propagations as early as possible in order to allow sufficient 
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warning time for reaction before the whole network is 
compromised. Examples of particularly disruptive worms 
include Code Red [3], Blaster [4], Sasser [5] and Slammer [6].  
 
Fig.12. Multi-level architecture for worm detection 
Worms typically spread through the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in the operating systems. Typically, a worm 
presents simple attack behaviours, and all computers infected by 
this worm will send malicious traffic with statistically similar 
behaviour. It differs from other challenges to network operation, 
such as a DDoS, in the sense that a DDoS has only one or a 
small number of targets, whereas a worm has no specific target 
in the network. 
Our proposed multi-level architecture for addressing worm 
detection includes both transport layer mechanisms operating at 
the core network as well as application layer mechanisms in the 
edge network. On the one hand, the transport layer analysis will 
use entropy distributions (of src/dst ports, src/dst IP addresses, 
payload, or byte and packet sizes) as input to the Bispectrum 
analysis. On the other hand, application layer analysis will 
perform time series analysis on application-layer protocols and 
use machine learning techniques for storing worm behaviour. 
The conceptual multi-level architecture for the worm scenario is 
depicted in Fig.12. This architecture relies on the cooperation 
between transport and application layer mechanisms to share and 
correlate information for identifying and predicting worm 
propagation. We intend to refine this architecture and simulate 
the interactions between core and edge mechanisms as part of 
our future work. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed the notion of multi-level network 
resilience. This work is motivated by the potential 
complementarities between the research being developed at IIT 
Madras and Lancaster University, in order to provide a 
collaborative traffic analysis and anomaly detection, combining 
mechanisms and algorithms deployed both in the core and edge 
networks. We described in this paper the current work developed 
at IIT Madras and Lancaster on traffic analysis and anomaly 
detection, which will form the basis of a multi-level resilience 
architecture. We also outlined the simulation platform we intend 
to use to evaluate our joint work, as well as a worm propagation 
case study scenario that illustrates how mechanisms from the 
two realms can be combined. 
As part of our future work, we are going to refine the ideas 
presented in this paper and, based on the case study scenario, 
propose a multi-level architecture using a combination of traffic 
classification and detection techniques operating both at the core 
and edge networks. The simulation platform will allow us to 
evaluate how network-, transport- and application-layer 
mechanisms can exchange information and operate together. 
Moreover, as part of the work on the multi-level resilience 
architecture we also intend to develop a joint data-set analysis 
and validation of anomaly detection methods and time series 
models. Both IIT Madras and Lancaster use time series models 
on different datasets, the former focusing on application and 
packet data from the network edge and the latter focusing on 
network flows at the network core. Although the approaches are 
sound, promising and have established similar ground truths, it 
is still necessary to validate these approaches on common data 
sets. 
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